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1. PREFACE  
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
issued a report in which it presented the concept of a Responsibility to Protect 
(hereinafter ‗R2P‘). For the drafters of the report, R2P referred to the ‗idea that 
sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that 
when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne 
by the broader community of states.‘1 
 
Peculiar about R2P is the connection its conceivers established between 
sovereignty and responsibility; a responsibility that first and foremost falls 
upon the state itself, but which subsequently – if the concerned state fails to 
live up to the obligations sovereignty brings along – falls upon the 
international community as a whole. This responsibility is perceived as an 
obligation. Whenever genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against 
humanity take place, the international community cannot sit still; it must 
intervene.  
 
This paper wishes to examine this aspect of responsibility which R2P appears 
to introduce. It has been argued before that sovereignty as responsibility is not 
a novelty introduced by R2P.2 Mysterious remains however the jump from 
responsibility to duty: why is it that, once sovereignty is overridden, the 
international community has an obligation to intervene?3 This paper wishes to 
trace the origins of the idea of such a duty to act, be it a perfect or an imperfect 
one.4 To do this, it will explore different narratives which have played a role in                                                         
1 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect (Ottawa, Canada: The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
2001), VIII. 
2 C. Stahn, ―Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?,‖ The 
American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (2007): 111. 
3 The question has been asked before. See, for example Kok-Chor Tan, ―The Duty to Protect,‖ 
Nomos 47 (2005): 3.  
4 The notion of a perfect duty stems from Kantian ethics. Kant himself defined such a duty as one 
which ‗allows no exception in the interest of [an agent‘s partial] inclinations.‘ See Immanuel 
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the just war debate. From these different narratives, a number of representative 
authors will be scrutinised. This paper does not pursue exhaustiveness (that 
would be impossible due to its limited length) but instead wishes to give an 
impression of the various voices in the debate; the combination of which has 
led to the transformation of a right to intervene, via a quasi-duty not to 
intervene, towards a duty to intervene. Apart from having a descriptive 
objective, this paper also wishes to evaluate R2P in the light of the tradition 
which came before it. A position will be taken and defended and suggestions 
for the future will be presented.  
 
The paper consists of five parts. After having presented the rise of R2P 
discourse together with a working definition of R2P in a preliminary section I, 
section II goes back to medieval times and discusses the natural law narrative 
on a right to intervene. Here, it is argued that for the sake of humanity, states 
ought to intervene whenever ‗natural law‘ is trampled upon, or whenever our 
‗common humanity‘ is disrespected. The following section (III) looks at the 
issue of intervention from the perspective of liberalism. Opposing conceptions 
of sovereignty will be compared, and the consequences these conceptions on 
sovereignty‘s corollary, the principle of non-intervention will be scrutinised. 
The current pluralism within the liberal narrative5 is held to stem from these 
diverging conceptions of sovereignty. At the end of this overview, in section 
IV, an attempt is made to situate R2P within this larger tradition. It will here be 
argued that R2P, and the conception of sovereignty as a responsibility and thus 
a duty to act when faced with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes 
against humanity at first sight seems to rehabilitate sovereignty, but in reality 
adds little new to the debate. Section V then finishes by formulating 
suggestions on a possible way forward. 
 
 
2. INTRODUCTION  
 
2.1. THE RISE OF R2P DISCOURSE 
 
When the Berlin Wall was torn down and the Soviet empire collapsed, hopes 
were voiced that the UN-system of collective dispute resolution would finally 
start to work as it was intended. Put in place in the direct aftermath of the 
Second World War, the freshly constructed system was quickly paralysed by 
the dynamics of the Cold War, which divided the world in two camps and left 
no place for multilateral, collective approaches to the resolution of conflicts. 
Between 1945 and 1990, power politics dominated the international relations                                                                                                                          
Kant,, Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals (Herbert James Paton (ed.), Harper & Row, 1964), 
413-414. 
5 I refer to the communitarian versus the cosmopolitan narrative, as presented by Michael Doyle in 
―International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,‖ International Studies Review 13, no. 1 
(March 2011): 72-84, http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00999.x. 
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scene. While the UN-system explicitly prohibited the unauthorised use of 
force,6 military interventions were commonplace.7 In true realist fashion,8 their 
rationale was in many cases the same: to further the national interests of the 
intervening power, and to preserve and defend their sphere of influence.  
 
In 1989, when the Cold War came to an end, a feeling of relief and optimism 
was very much present.9 The 1990s announced themselves as the ‗decade of 
international law‘. Finally, after fifty years of deadlock, the UN-system would 
start to work as it was intended. And initially, this is what appeared to happen. 
The first US intervention in Iraq was supported by a UN Security Council 
resolution, and the US went in together with a large coalition, under UN flag.  
 
However, one could say that in the years after Iraq, this optimism and the 
belief in international law died at least three times. It died a first time in the 
little Bosnian town of Srebrenica, where between 7 000 and 8 000 muslim men 
were slaughtered by Bosnian-Serbian troops even though the zone where the 
muslims were gathered was proclaimed as ‗safe ground‘ by the UN. Dutch UN 
forces were present but did not intervene.10 The massacre of Srebrenica was 
the first genocide to be committed on the European continent since the 
Holocaust.  
 
In 1994, the belief in international law died a second time. When approaching 
Kigali airport, a missile struck down the aeroplane bringing back Rwandan 
president Juvénal Habyarimana from a round of peace negotiations in the 
Tanzanian city of Arusha. All passengers including the Rwandan president 
were killed. Just hours later, in a context in which ethnic tensions between the 
Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority had reached unprecedented heights, all 
hell broke loose. An estimated 800 000 people were murdered in what most 
likely became the biggest organised mass murder since the Holocaust.11 Prior 
and during the genocide,12 a United Nations (UN) mission was present in the                                                         
6 See article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
7 Both blocs were very active. Think for example of the US intervention in Nicaragua and the 
USSR intervention in Afghanistan.  
8 In the literature (see for example Michael Walzer, Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with 
historical illustrations, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), chap. 1.), the work of the ancient 
Greek historian Thucydides is often referred to as the first realist account in the ‗Just War‘ debate. 
See Thucydides, ―The Melian Dialogue,‖ in History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner 
(Harmondsworth; Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), 400-408. 
9 M. Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law,‖ The Modern Law Review 65, no. 2 (2002): 160; P. Allott, Eunomia: new order 
for a new world (Oxford University Press, 2001), vii et seq. 
10 For a full report, see Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
53/35, ‗The Fall of Srebrenica‘, 15 November 1999, A/54/549 accessible on 
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/srebrenica.pdf (last accessed on 27 June 2011). 
11 For an overview of the events, see UN, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the 
United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 1999, S/1999/1257.  
12 Shortly after the events, the UN Secretary-General concluded that ‗the magnitude of  the human 
calamity that has engulfed Rwanda might be unimaginable for its having transpired. On the basis 
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country. However, it did not intervene. The Canadian commander of the 
mission, Romeo Dallaire, had previously called upon the UN and its member 
states to provide the mission with 5 000 peacekeepers and the mandate to take 
hate-speech radio stations such as Radio Milles Collines out of the air. 
According to Dallaire, not more than that was needed to prevent the atrocities 
from taking place.13  Due to a ‗lack of political will‘,14 the Security Council on 
21 April – in the midst of the genocide – decided to reduce the size of the UN 
mission to about 270 peacekeepers.15 
 
In 1999, the belief in international law died a third time. In the (then) Serbian 
province of Kosovo, a war had broken out between the Kosovo Liberation 
Army  and the Serbian forces. When the news of ethnic cleansing taking place 
reached western capitals, attempts were made in the UN Security Council to 
come to a resolution allowing for an intervention. These attempts failed. 
Eventually, with the traumatising experiences of Srebrenica and Rwanda fresh 
in memory, a coalition of western states decided to intervene without a UN 
mandate. 500 Serbs were killed during the bombing of Serbian targets.16  
 
The intervention in Kosovo was illegal: it constituted an obvious breach of 
article 2 of the UN Charter.17 However, with international law having lost 
much of its credibility, the argument was raised: can such a breach not be 
morally justifiable? Can we not push international law aside for a moment 
when basic feelings of morality require us to intervene? Such was the plea of 
former British prime minister Blair, who in a 1999 speech called the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo a ‗just war‘.18 By doing so, Mr. Blair pulled out of the 
                                                                                                                         
of the evidence that has emerged, there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide.‘ (UN 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda, S/1994/640, 10).  
13 Gareth Evans, The responsibility to protect : ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all 
(Washington  D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 28. 
14 UN, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda, 1999, S/1999/1257, 43. 
15 Ibid., 22. and UN Security Council, Resolution 912 (1994), 21 April 1994, S/RES/912. 
16 Amnesty International, ―NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ‗Collateral Damage‘ or 
Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force‖, 
2000, 1, footnote 2. 
17 For an overview of the positions on the legality/morality of the Kosovo intervention, see M. 
Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International 
Law,‖ The Modern Law Review 65, no. 2 (2002): 162. The dominant account appears to have 
become the one holding that the intervention was both formally illegal and morally necessary. See, 
for example, A Cassese, ―Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of 
forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?,‖ European Journal of 
International Law 10, no. 1 (1999): 23. 
18 He continued by saying that the war was ‗based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. 
We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have 
learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator 
range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.‘ For 
the full text of the speech, see http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-
june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html (last accessed on 27 June 2011). 
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bottom drawer an ancient doctrine which was thought to have disappeared with 
the establishment of the UN in 1945.  
 
The UN itself undertook similar steps. After being confronted again with its 
incapability to act during the Kosovo crisis, the then Secretary-General Kofi 
Anan called for radical change; an outcry which was followed up by the UN 
General Assembly in the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted in 
2000.19 In two speeches before the General Assembly, the Secretary-General 
made clear what was at stake: 
(...) if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross 
and systemic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our 
common humanity? 
In other words, for such atrocities to be banned from the face of the earth, what 
was needed was an abandonment of the concept of sovereignty as ‗a shield for 
gross violations of human rights‘.20  
 
The call issued by the Secretary-General was not left unanswered. In 
September 2000, the Canadian government led by liberal Prime Minister 
Martin brought together a panel of intellectuals. Their mission:  
to promote a comprehensive debate on the issues, and to foster global political 
consensus on how to move from polemics, and often paralysis, towards action 
within the international system, particularly through the United Nations.21  
Approximately one year later,  the ‗International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty‘ (ICISS) handed over to the Canadian government their 
final report, entitled ‗The Responsibility to Protect‘.  
 
In the report, the authors – among whom former Australian foreign minister 
Gareth Evans as well as the by now former leader of the Canadian Liberal 
Party Michael Ignatieff – pleaded for the introduction of a new concept: the 
‗Responsibility to Protect‘ (in the following: ‗R2P‘). Even though they 
acknowledged that this novel concept corresponded to a great extent with the 
older concept of humanitarian intervention, they also argued that R2P went 
beyond then current international law.22 However, changing positive 
international law was not their primary objective. Instead, what they wanted to 
achieve was a change of perspective. In the 1990s, Bernard Kouchner (the 
founder of Médecins sans frontières who later on became French foreign 
minister) had launched the idea of a droit d’ingérence, a right for states to                                                         
19 UN General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2000, A/RES/55/2.  
20 P. Hilpold, ―The Duty to Protect and the Reform of the United Nations-A New Step in the 
Development of International Law,‖ Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006): 50. 
21 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect (Ottawa, Canada: The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
2001), 81. 
22 For Evans, R2P is ‗a lot more than humanitarian intervention‘. While humanitarian intervention 
is nothing more than ‗coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes‘, R2P is first and 
foremost about taking preventive action (Evans, The responsibility to protect, 56.) See also infra. 
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intervene – by military force if necessary – in another state committing mass 
atrocities.23 While the concept certainly had its merits (it added to the already 
old idea of humanitarian intervention a layer of much needed legitimacy), it 
also provoked severe criticism. Especially developing states saw in the concept 
a possible pretext for the great powers to intervene for other reasons than 
purely humanitarian ones. As pointed out by Gareth Evans, the idea of 
‗ingérence’ has a double connotation: it can refer to ‗intervention‘ as well as 
‗interference‘.24 
 
Therefore, the objective of R2P, as conceived by the authors of the ICISS 
report, was to restore the balance by stressing the responsibility of the state 
itself to prevent mass atrocities. In their own words:  
intervention for human protection purposes, including military intervention in 
extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or 
imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to 
end the harm, or itself the perpetrator.25 
The primary responsibility to tackle a humanitarian crisis within the borders of 
a given state thus lies with the state itself.26 The members of the ICISS see this 
shift of perspective as a reconceptualisation: from sovereignty as control to 
sovereignty as responsibility.27 International, external intervention is only 
justified if the state is ‗unwilling or unable to halt or avert‘ the crisis.28  
 
Hence, R2P should be seen as a new perspective, an attempt to change the 
language of the debate. Even though such a change in perspective is not a 
panacea, its importance should not be underestimated either, the members of 
the commission argue. In their own words:  
this does not, of course, change the substantive issues which have to be 
addressed. There still remain to be argued all the moral, legal, political and 
operational questions (...) which have themselves been so difficult and 
divisive. But if people are prepared to look at all these issues from the new 
perspective that we propose, it may just make finding agreed answers that 
much easier.29  
More concretely, they see three advantages. First, R2P implies an evaluation of 
the issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather                                                         
23 Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner,  e devoir d’ingérence   peut-on les laisser mourir ? (Paris: 
No l, 1987). 
24 Evans, The responsibility to protect, 33. 
25 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect, 16. 
26 As indicated by the members of the commission themselves, the major issue at hand is the gap 
between on the one hand, the international legal system which is designed to maintain 
international peace and, on the other hand, the proliferation of internal conflicts. How can the UN 
and international society as a whole tackle these crises without giving up on the premises on which 
that very society is built, namely the principle of sovereignty and its manifestation in the principle 
of non-intervention? (Ibid., 13) The issue will be discussed at length below. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., XI. 
29 Ibid., 12. 
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than those who may be considering intervention. Second, it acknowledges that 
the primary responsibility rests with the state concerned. Third, it means not 
just the ‗responsibility to react,‘ but the ‗responsibility to prevent‘ and the 
‗responsibility to rebuild‘ as well.30 In other words, the scope of R2P is larger 
than that of the traditional humanitarian intervention. While the latter is limited 
to the use of force, the former includes humanitarian assistance and the 
development of strategies to rebuild society after the advent of a humanitarian 
crisis. 
 
After the publication of the report, things went fast. In 2002, the newly created 
African Union incorporated the concept in its constitutive charter.31 While 
article 4(g) refers to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other member states, article 4(h) establishes the ‗right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect 
of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.‘ The African Union thus became the first international organisation 
(albeit a regional one) to convert the R2P-principle into positive law. 
 
Nevertheless, the global breakthrough of R2P took place in 2005 when the 
principle was taken up by the heads of state and government in the outcome 
document of the UN World Summit.32 Shortly after, the Secretary-General 
endorsed the outcome of the Summit and embraced the concept of R2P in a 
report entitled ‗In Larger Freedom: Towards Development and Human Rights 
for All‘.33 Even though some argue that a significant gap exists between R2P 
as conceived by the ICISS and the version that was eventually agreed upon by 
the states,34 the president of the ICISS itself argues that the main principles of 
R2P have found their way into the World Summit Outcome.35  
 
In the period following 2005, R2P made its way into some UN Security 
Council resolutions. In April 2006 the Council ‗reaffirmed‘36 the outcome of 
the 2005 World Summit in a thematic resolution.37 Just a few months later, in 
August 2006, it did so again in a resolution dealing with the situation in 
Darfur.38 However, until now R2P has not been invoked in a consistent 
                                                        
30 Ibid., 17. 
31 For an account, see B. Kioko, ―The right of intervention under the African Union‘s Constitutive 
Act: From non-interference to non-intervention,‖ Revue Internationale de la Croix-
Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross 85, no. 852 (2003): 807–826. 
32 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 of 16 September 2005. 
33 UN doc. A/59/2005. 
34 Hilpold, ―The Duty to Protect and the Reform of the United Nations-A New Step in the 
Development of International Law,‖ 38. 
35 Evans, The responsibility to protect, 47. 
36 Which is, admittedly, a rather odd term considering the short life of the concept of R2P at that 
moment. 
37 UN Security Council, Resolution 1674. 
38 UN Security Council, Resolution 1706. 
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manner. While R2P has indeed been mentioned on several occasions,39 other 
situations have been dealt with without reference to the concept.40 
 
All in all, R2P has already had an astonishing career. Conceived merely ten 
years ago, the question is already raised whether R2P has acquired the status of 
customary international law.41 Its strongest opponents cannot but congratulate 
the conceivers of R2P with such a success.42  
 
However, the R2P-story is not all roses. As often happens in international 
society, what is initially created out of idealistic ambitions is quickly taken 
over by more earthly forces43: while R2P was conceived as a concept 
encouraging states to act, it quickly came to be used by states to legitimise 
arguments against action. By stressing the primary obligation of the state in 
which atrocities occur, other states have found in R2P an argument not to 
intervene.44 Furthermore, the objection of renewed imperialism has not 
disappeared either. Quickly after its conception, the Bush administration 
invoked R2P in support of its doctrine of pre-emptive strikes to prevent 
dictators from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.45 R2P has thus been 
invoked in support of the invasion of Iraq.46 In 2008, Russia called upon R2P 
in support of its invasion of Georgia.47  Without going into details, one may 
nevertheless wonder whether these kind of actions were really what the 
members of the ICISS had in mind when developing R2P. 
 
The proliferation of situations in which R2P is being invoked in recent years 
has led to growing criticism. While some are asking out loud whether R2P is 
not yet another tactic of the great powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
                                                        
39 For an overview, see A. J Bellamy, ―The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,‖ Ethics & 
International Affairs 24, no. 2 (2010): 149-150. 
40 As indicated by Bellamy, the UNMIS peace operation in South Sudan, as well as the situations 
in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan have all been dealt with and justified without reference to R2P 
(Ibid., 150-151). 
41 J. Brunnee and S. J Toope, ―The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building 
Legality?,‖ Global Responsibility to Protect 2, no. 3 (2010): 191–212. 
42 José E Alvarez, ―The Schizophrenias of R2P,‖ in Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of 
Force, The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 276. 
43 Martti Koskenniemi, From apology to utopia : the structure of international legal argument 
(Cambridge  NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
44 Alex J. Bellamy, ―Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,‖ Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (September 2005): 
33, http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00499.x. 
45 L. Feinstein and A. M Slaughter, ―A duty to prevent,‖ Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 136–
150. 
46 F. R Tesón, ―Ending tyranny in Iraq,‖ Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 1–20. 
47 Russia grounded its claims on its responsibility to protect its own citizens abroad, an argument 
that was quickly wiped off the table as it fell outside of the scope of R2P. See Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect, ―The Georgia-Russia Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect: 
Background Note‖, 2008, 1. 
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weaker states,48 others consider R2P to be an empty box or too vague to be 
really operational.49 Yet other scholars wish to safeguard sovereignty‘s central 
position in international society.50 
 
Despite the ongoing confusion, the UN has not given up on R2P. On the 
contrary, R2P as a concept has become generally accepted at the UN level, 
which has allowed a shift from discussions on the concept itself to debates on 
the ways in which to implement it. In 2007, Columbia University professor 
Edward Luck was appointed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon as 
special advisor on R2P.51 In 2009, a report was issued containing a strategy to 
implement R2P.52 In that same year, the General Assembly debated the matter. 
A consensus in support of the Secretary-General‘s approach was reached.53  
 
The foregoing overview has briefly expounded on what the conceivers of R2P 
meant by that term and has also shown that R2P plays an important role in the 
contemporary discourse surrounding essential and ongoing debates in 
international law. Regardless of whether RP2 is genuinely a new concept or 
merely ‗old wine in new bottles‘,54 the coming into being of R2P has not gone 
unnoticed. In its short life, it has been used by many international actors as a 
speech act55 in support of their foreign policy agendas. Because of this, it 
would not be wise simply to put aside R2P for bearing close resemblance to 
already well-known concepts such as the ‗right of interference‘ or 
‗humanitarian intervention‘.  
 
2.2. A DEFINITION OF R2P 
 
Even though R2P has played a prominent role in contemporary discourse on 
the question of a right of humanitarian intervention, its exact definition 
remains unclear. R2P is invoked by various actors, and concerns are raised that 
R2P misses the necessary conceptual clarity to be used effectively as a concept                                                         
48 This question has been addressed by, among others, Bellamy in ―Responsibility to Protect or 
Trojan Horse?‖. In this conception, sovereignty is regarded as a concept which protects the weaker 
states against the imperialism of the stronger (The International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 7). 
49 C. Focarelli, ―The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many 
Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine,‖ Journal of Conflict and Security Law 13, no. 2 (August 
2008): 191-213, http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jcsl/krn014. 
50 Alvarez, ―The Schizophrenias of R2P.‖ 
51 UN News Centre, ―Secretary-General appoints special adviser to focus on responsibility to 
protect‖, 02 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25702&Cr=ki-moon&Cr1. 
52 UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009, A/63/677. 
53 Office of the President of the General Assembly, ―Concept Note on Responsibility to Protect 
Populations from Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes against Humanity‖, 2009. 
See also Bellamy, ―The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,‖ 147. 
54 Stahn, ―Responsibility to Protect.‖ Cf. infra.  
55 On the notion of speech act, see J Austin, How to do things with words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975). And on R2P as a speech act, see Eli Stamnes, ―‗Speaking R2P‘ 
and the Prevention of Mass Atrocities,‖ Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 1 (2009). 
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in the fight against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against 
humanity.56 
 
This paper adheres to the definition of R2P as proposed by the UN Secretary-
General, who – drawing from the wordings of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, identified R2P as a concept consisting of three pillars: 
 (1) The primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations 
from the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity, as well as from their incitement. 
 (2) The international community‘s responsibility to assist a state to fulfil 
its R2P. 
 (3) The international community‘s responsibility to take timely and 
decisive action, in accordance with the UN Charter, in cases where the state 
has manifestly failed to protect its population from one or more of the four 
crimes.57 
 
It has been argued by Carsten Stahn that R2P entails both tradition and 
innovation.58 As for tradition, it was argued that sovereignty as responsibility 
is an idea which has a long history; one in which illustrious philosophers such 
as Grotius and John Locke have played an important role. Furthermore, it was 
submitted that the fact that responsibility as responsibility entails duties is not 
a novelty either. ‗Sovereignty never meant that a state could act in its territory 
regardless of the effect of its acts on another state,‘ Stahn argued.59 Moreover, 
the criteria for the legitimacy of an intervention also find their origins in just 
war doctrine.60 As for the innovative character of R2P, Stahn mentions the link 
between R2P and human security, which in turn refers to a basic feeling of 
global solidarity. R2P is thus held to transform this until recently merely moral 
notion into a legal obligation, one which goes further than the legal framework 
developed in the ILC Articles on State responsibility. 
 
This paper focuses on the idea of sovereignty-as-responsibility, that of human 
security, as well as the relationship between both. Therefore, the main 
questions of this paper are 1) whether in international ethics61 traces can be 
found of a conception of  sovereignty as responsibility, and 2) whether traces 
can be found of a notion of collective responsibility.                                                          
56 See on this point Focarelli, ―The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian 
Intervention.‖ 
57 UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009, A/63/677. 
58 Stahn, ―Responsibility to Protect,‖ 110 et seq. 
59 Ibid., 112. 
60 Ibid., 114. Noteworthy are the criteria of just cause, right intention, last resort and 
proportionality of means.  
61 For the purpose of this paper, ‗international ethics‘ is conceived as an area of international 
relations theory which concerns the extent and scope of ethical obligations between states. 
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This enquiry starts by looking at the natural law tradition.  
 
 
3. NATURAL LAW 
 
A crucial thinker in the natural law tradition was Grotius. Grotius, a Dutchman 
who lived at the time of the Eighty Years‘ War between Spain and the 
Netherlands and the Thirty Years‘ War between catholics and protestants, is 
considered as one of the founding fathers of modern international law. The 
tradition he started together with men such as Gentili and de Vitoria is based 
on the assumption that above positive law (which Grotius calls ‗civil law‘) 
there is a natural law, a law  
which prevailed long before the foundation of states, and which still exists in 
all its force, in places, where the community consists of families distinct, and 
united as the subjects of one sovereign.62 
This law is based not on the authority of God, but on a notion of a societas 
humana: the idea that all men are part of one human society.63  
 
Relevant for our account is Grotius‘ book De jure belli ac pacis,64 in which he 
expounds on the notion of ‗just war‘. Published 26 years prior to the 
publication of Hobbes‘ Leviathan,65 but several years after that of Bodin‘s Six 
livres de la République,66 one can already identify strong influences of 
sovereignty thinking.67 Sovereignty was originally developed as a concept to 
introduce peace and stability on the then turbulent, war-torn European 
continent. Because of this, Grotius is careful not to develop a general right to 
intervene in other states, and is in general remarkably tolerant towards peoples 
of other faiths.68 He does, however, identify two cases in which a state or a 
prince has the right to intervene:                                                          
62 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations, trans. 
A.M. Campbell (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), 179, http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/553. 
63 J Holzgrefe, Humanitarian intervention : ethical, legal, and political dilemmas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26. Note that, as indicated by the same Holzgrefe, natural law 
thinking actually predates Christianity. Cicero held that natural law is ‗right reason in harmony 
with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its 
commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions… we cannot be freed from its 
obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or 
interpreter of it.‘ (Marcus Cicero, De re publica, De legibus (Cambridge  Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1928), 211; Holzgrefe, Humanitarian intervention, 25). 
64 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations. 
65 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Meppel [etc.]: Boom, 1985). 
66 Jean Bodin, Six books of the commonwealth (B. Blackwell, 1955). 
67 Interesting in that regard is that Grotius wrote his book on just wars while in exile in Paris. It is 
not inconceivable that he was thus influenced by the works of Bodin who was active in Paris at the 
same time.  
68 Grotius thus rejects the idea that a state can go to war against another state for reasons related to 
a different interpretation of the Christian faith, or a rejection of the Christian faith all together 
(Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations, 177-178, 
183). 
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(1) he has the right to intervene as a form of punishment for ‗gross 
violations of the law of nature and of nations, done to other states and 
subjects,‘69 
 
(2) he has the right to intervene and go to war ‗to help others.‘70  
 
As for the first category (war as punishment), Grotius had in mind the battle 
against pirates, general robbers, and ‗enemies of the human race‘.71 The idea of 
a war to punish, in my view, implies that war is here seen as an ex post 
intervention. It therefore does not correspond with what is today regarded as a 
humanitarian intervention, which is intended to be put in place while atrocities 
are still taking place.72  
 
The second category (war to help others), however, comes closer to the idea of 
an intervention to stop atrocities from taking place. Especially interesting are 
Grotius words when he relates the right to go to war for others with the notion 
of sovereignty. Here, he holds that  
Every sovereign is supreme judge in his own kingdom and over his own 
subjects, in whose disputes no foreign power can justly interfere. Yet where a 
Busiris (...) provoke[s] [its] people to despair and resistance by unheard of 
cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose the 
rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the 
law of nations.73  
In other words, whenever a state commits ‗unheard of cruelties‘ against its 
population, sovereignty disappears. Grotius thus connects sovereignty with 
legitimacy. As in the liberal tradition which will be discussed further on, 
Grotius does not regard sovereignty as the de facto exercise of power. What 
distinguishes his account from the liberal one, however, is the source of this 
legitimacy. While the former looks at natural law to provide the required 
legitimacy, the latter looks at a Lockean social contract between the state and 
its people.  
 
Regardless of this discussion, the point remains that Grotius makes a strong 
case for a right of foreign states to intervene whenever mass atrocities take 
                                                        
69 Ibid., 178. 
70 Grotius identifies four categories of states against which a state can go to war : (1) states which 
attack one‘s own citizens, (2) allies, (3) friends, and (4) states with peoples ‗of one common 
nature‘ (Ibid., 205-207.  
71 Ibid., 178. 
72 Contra: see Terry Nardin, ―The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention,‖ Ethics & 
International Affairs 16 (2002): 62. 
73 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations, 207. 
Emphasis added. 
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place.74 This right however, remains a mere right, and does not impose duties 
on the foreign states. Grotius had the following to say on this point: 
...In the first place it is certain that no one is bound to give assistance or 
protection, when it will be attended with evident danger. For a man‘s own life 
and property, and a state‘s own existence and preservation are either to the 
individual, or the state, objects of greater value and prior consideration than 
the welfare and security of other individuals or states. 
Nor will states or individuals be bound to risk their own safety, even when the 
aggrieved or oppressed party cannot be relieved but by the destruction of the 
invader or oppressor. For under some circumstances it is impossible 
successfully to oppose cruelty and oppression, the punishment of which must 
be left to the eternal judge of mankind.75 
As mentioned by Chesterman, Grotius thus regards a ‗humanitarian‘ 
intervention more as a legal right than a moral duty.76 Nardin added to that that 
Grotius‘ position can be explained by the basis of his morality, which is first 
and foremost one of self-preservation.77 Later scholars such as Samuel 
Pufendorf did not agree with Grotius. Pufendorf talked of an ‗imperfect duty‘ 
to intervene, which Nardin interpreted as a ‗duty of beneficence to be 
performed insofar as it can be performed without disproportionate 
inconvenience.‘78 
 
All in all, one can say that in Grotius‘ work, a bias towards non-intervention is 
present. In extreme cases, states have a right to intervene, but the default 
position is that sovereigns do not mingle in the affairs of one another. The 
explanation for this bias is not difficult to find: preventing war from braking 
out was one of the main incentives for Grotius to develop his theory.   
 
As liberal as well as positivist thought grew in importance and the notion of 
sovereignty and non-intervention transformed along the way, so did the 
theories on ‗just war‘ deriving their legitimacy from natural law. Even though 
context changed radically, the natural law stream of thought never                                                         
74 A remarkable feature of Grotius theory of a just war is that he does not allow citizens to rise up 
against the state when such ‗unheard of cruelties‘ take place. In Hobbesian fashion, Grotius argues 
that subjects are and remain subjects; they have to obey. Other states, which are not subject to the 
will of the same sovereign, are not bound by such a requirement. Therefore, they have the 
possibility to intervene (Ibid., 208.) By this claim, it becomes clear that Grotius‘ theory dates from 
a different timeframe than that of – for example – John Stuart Mill. Mill, one of the founding 
fathers of modern liberalism, argued in his ‗A Few Words on Non-Intervention‘ the exact 
opposite. If citizens of a state wish to be free, it is first and foremost their own responsibility to 
achieve such freedom. Freedom cannot be imposed from the outside (John Stuart Mill, ―A few 
words on non-intervention,‖ New England Review (1990-) 27, no. 3 (2006): 252–264). This 
contrast illustrates the shift in thinking on the idea of ‗just war‘ due to the advent of modern liberal 
thought. 
75 Ibid., v. II, xxv, 7. Emphasis added. 
76 Simon Chesterman, Just war or just peace? : humanitarian intervention and international law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 14. 
77 Nardin, ―The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention,‖ 61. 
78 Ibid., 62. 
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disappeared. Until today, there are those pleading for a right of humanitarian 
intervention in the name of our ‗common morality‘.79  
 
Terry Nardin is one of these scholars.80 He starts his analysis with a reference 
to Kant. A straight line can be drawn between Kant‘s principle of respect81 and 
what we now know to be human rights. Human rights, Nardin argues, are the 
manifestations of a ‗common morality‘, which is based on the requirement to 
respect one another. Such a morality is minimal, and it is a morality of 
constraint.82 Since it does not depend on the recognition by either peoples nor 
states, it encompasses the whole of what Grotius would call the societas 
humana. Human rights, it is argued, are in most cases universal moral rights.83  
 
In other words, in the twentieth century, natural law-thinking reappeared in the 
shape of human rights.84 Amartya Sen, in a contribution to a symposium 
dealing with the distinction between human rights and culturally determined 
values, defined the notion of human rights in a particularly precise way. In one 
sweep, he applied that definition to the question of interventionism:  
In the most general form, the notion of human rights builds on our shared 
humanity. These rights are not derived from the citizenship of any country, or 
the membership of any nation, but taken as entitlements of every human being. 
(...)Since the conception of human rights transcends local legislation and the 
citizenship of the person affected, it is not surprising that support for human 
rights can also come from anyone — whether or not she is a citizen of the 
same country as the person whose rights are threatened. (...)This basic 
recognition does not, of course, suggest that everyone must intervene 
constantly in protecting and helping others. (...)Ubiquitous interventionism is 
not particularly fruitful or attractive within a given country, or across national 
boundaries. There is no obligation to roam the four corners of the earth in 
search of liberties to protect. The claim is only that the barriers of nationality 
and citizenship do not preclude people from taking legitimate interest in the 
rights of others and even from assuming some duties related to them.85                                                              
79 Ibid., 64. 
80 Nardin, ―The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention.‖   
81 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the metaphysics of morals   and, what is enlightenment?, 1st ed. 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 66-67. 
82 Nardin, ―The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention,‖ 65. 
83 Ibid. 
84 One might raise one‘s eyebrows by this jump from an idea of common morality to that of human 
rights. Marrti Koskenniemi, for his part, does not agree with this connection. ‗Rights depend on 
their meaning and force on the character of the political community in which they function‘. 
(Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law,‖ 167) Even though one can agree with that position, the fact nevertheless 
remains that the nuance is in most cases overlooked. Human rights are presented as something 
‗given to human society instead of created by it, like God‘s words.‘ (Ibid.). In cosmopolitan 
discourse (cf. infra) this is particularly true.  
85 Amartya Sen, ―Human Rights and Asian Values‖ (presented at the Sixteenth Morgenthau 
Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy, New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
International Affairs, 1997), 28-30. Emphasis added. 
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With these words, Sen takes a nuanced position on the question of the 
permissibility of intervention by one state in another. Because of the universal 
character of human rights, their reach goes beyond national borders. 
Consequently, one cannot invoke sovereignty when human rights are at under 
threat. However, Sen does not regard this right to intervene as an obligation.  
 
This position begs the obvious question: why is there not an obligation to 
intervene? It is interesting to note, as indicated by Holzgrefe, that in many 
cases natural law/human rights thinkers oppose too strict an interpretation of 
non-intervention.86 However, many if not most of them refuse to reject non-
intervention all together. Perhaps ironically, Kant himself  argued in favour of 
non intervention.87 Hence, while many (as Pufendorf) identified an imperfect 
duty to intervene in other states for the sake of a common morality, others 
were and are in favour of an (almost) perfect duty of non-intervention. I 
believe the quest for an explanation to this peculiar situation cannot be found 
inside of the natural law tradition. Instead, one has to widen the scope of one‘s 
inquiry and look at what has been said in the liberal narrative on the topic of 
sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of non-intervention. As will be 
discussed later on, from the contact between liberal thought and human rights 
discourse, a ‗transformation‘ of international legal discourse will come forth.88  
As cosmopolitan thought grew in importance, the usefulness of state 
sovereignty was more and more questioned.  
 
 
4. LIBERALISM 
 
When talking about sovereignty and its corollary non-intervention, one cannot 
help but notice that a fascinating evolution has taken place within the liberal 
tradition.89 Based on a diverging interpretation of sovereignty which can be 
traced back to Locke and Hobbes, two competing narratives today co-exist. 
First, communitarianism will be discussed; the narrative that can be regarded 
as the traditional liberal account. Communitarianism has been a strong 
influence on the drafters of the UN Charter. The principle of sovereign 
equality of all states undoubtedly finds its origins in the writings of John Stuart 
Mill which will be discussed in the following. However, in more recent years a 
competing liberal tradition has seen the light. Equating sovereignty with the                                                         
86 Holzgrefe, Humanitarian intervention, 28. 
87 See, most famously, the fifth principle of Kant‘s Perpetual Peace: ‗No state shall violently 
interfere with the constitution and administration of another.‘ (Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace - 
A Philosophical Essay, trans. M. A. Campbell Smith (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1917), 112). 
88 R. G Teitel, ―Humanity‘s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics,‖ Cornell Int’l  J 35 
(2001): 356 et seq. 
89 For the purpose of this paper, I use a very wide conception of liberalism which I borrow from 
Michael Doyle, who distinguished between a realist, a Marxist and a liberal account on 
humanitarian intervention. For Doyle, liberalism includes both the communitarian account and the 
cosmopolitan one. See Doyle, ―International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,‖ 74. 
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Hobbesian, statist version of it, this cosmopolitan narrative proclaims the end 
of sovereignty and the state-centred paradigm of international law. Instead, 
cosmopolitanism makes use of the human rights discourse to create a 
‗transnational‘ legal regime which focuses on the rights of individuals and 
peoples.90 
 
This section first draws the distinction between the liberal Lockean conception 
of sovereignty and its statist counterpart which is inspired by Hobbes. 
Subsequently, it discusses both communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.  
 
4.1. SOVEREIGNTY: BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND STATISM 
 
Sovereignty is not an invention of states.  Those philosophers who are today 
best known for having developed the theoretical underpinning of a quasi-
absolute authority for the state, were in reality driven by feelings of solidarity 
towards those suffering due to endless religious wars. The main concern of 
Jean Bodin, one of the earliest philosophers using the term sovereignty and 
calling it ‗la puissance absolue et perpetuelle d‘une République‘91, was to end 
religious wars on the European continent.92 Hobbes too regarded sovereignty 
as a concept to get all people out of the state of nature, which Hobbes – as is 
well known – regarded as ‗solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.‘93  
 
Unsurprisingly however, the concept of sovereignty, presented as the conferral 
of absolute authority to a Leviathan was quickly picked up by the states. As 
argued in realist thinking,94 states are often driven by a desire to further their 
self-interests. While philosophers as Bodin and Hobbes thus looked at a strong 
state to protect its citizens, the states themselves downplayed the second part 
of the social contract concluded between them and their population. As pointed 
out by Fernando Tesón, sovereignty came to be seen as an end in itself; the end 
being the survival and the self-interest of the state.95 It is from this statist 
conception of sovereignty that was derived the quasi absolute prohibition for 
states to mingle in the affairs of other states.96 Entrenched in positive law in                                                         
90 Teitel, ―Humanity‘s Law,‖ 362. 
91 Bodin, Six books of the commonwealth. 
92 Telling is the fact that Bodin‘s last publication was one in which representatives of all faiths 
discussed the virtue of tolerance (Jean Bodin, Colloquium of the seven about secrets of the sublime 
(University Park  Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008)). 
93 Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. XIII. 
94 Thucydides, ―The Melian Dialogue.‖ 
95 Fernando R. Tesón, ―The liberal case for humanitarian intervention,‖ in Humanitarian 
intervention : ethical, legal, and political dilemmas, ed. J Holzgrefe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 110. 
96 As pointed out by Chesterman, there have been some philosophers pleading for an absolute 
prohibition of intervention. However, when reading them more carefully, their account appears 
more nuanced. Interesting here is the distinction between ‗intervene‘ and ‗interfere‘.  When all 
goes well, foreign states ought not to interfere. If, however, severe oppression is taking place, an 
oppression against which the population revolts, then foreign states have a legal right to assist the 
population. This is the position of Vattel (see Chesterman, Just war or just peace?, 18). Kant 
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1648 in the series of treaties together constituting the Peace of Westphalia,97 
the principle of non-intervention has been one of the cornerstones of 
international law ever since. By over-simplifying the concept and ignoring one 
of both legs upon which sovereignty was intended to stand (namely the aspect 
of legitimacy,98 the requirement for the state to protect its own population), the 
states incorporated sovereignty in their discourse and used it as a self-
legitimising concept. 
 
As mentioned, such was not the original meaning of sovereignty. Hobbes 
himself regarded sovereignty as being part of a social contract between the 
state and its people. Curiously enough, and logically hard to understand, this 
contract was not subject to cancellation. Once the people (who at the time of 
conclusion of the contract were regarded as rational actors) had signed the 
agreement, they were submitted to the rule of the sovereign per aeternitatem.99  
 
John Locke, another important 17th century English thinker, noticed this 
peculiarity. In his famous work Two Treatises of Government100 Locke 
presents us with a two-way social contract. The people – regarded by Locke as 
the ultimate holders of authority – delegate authority to the state. As long as 
the state holds the trust of the people, it has the legitimacy to exercise 
authority. Therefore, and even though Locke himself never used the term 
‗sovereignty‘ but instead preferred to talk about ‗absolute‘ or ‗supream‘ 
power101, sovereignty by Locke is conceived as serving a goal external to 
sovereignty itself: its raison d’être is to protect the rights of its population. If a 
state fails to do so, then the social contract ends, and sovereignty disappears. 
This liberal conception of sovereignty reappears at the end of the twentieth                                                                                                                          
himself said something similar. While taking the principle of non-intervention as one of the 
cornerstones of international society, Kant also held that ‗In this connection, it is true, we cannot 
count the case of a state which has become split up through internal corruption into two parts, each 
of them representing by itself an individual state which lays claim to the whole. Here the yielding 
of assistance to one faction could not be reckoned as interference on the part of a foreign state with 
the constitution of another, for here anarchy prevails. So long, however, as the inner strife has not 
yet reached this stage the interference of other powers would be a violation of the rights of an 
independent nation which is only struggling with internal disease. It would therefore itself cause a 
scandal, and make the autonomy of all states insecure.‘ (Kant, Perpetual Peace - A Philosophical 
Essay, 113-114.) Emphasis added. 
97 As stressed by Jean Cohen, we should not equate sovereignty as conceived by the drafters of the 
Westphalia treaty with the conception of it which has inspired the UN Charter. The former leans 
closely to the statist conception, the latter to the liberal (communitarian) conception. See Jean L. 
Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law,‖ Ethics and International Affairs 
18, no. 3 (December 2004): 12, http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2004.tb00474.x. 
98 On sovereignty-as-legitimacy, see also D. Luban, ―Just war and human rights,‖ Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 9, no. 2 (1980): 167. 
99 Eric Driscoll, ―Locke and Hobbes,‖ Classics of Social and Political Thought, J.P. McCormick, 
2008, 2-3. 
100 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: for Thomas Tegg; W. Sharpe and Son; G. 
Offor; G. and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co.: Also R. Griffin and Co. Glasgow; and J. Gumming, 
Dublin, 1823). 
101 Driscoll, ―Locke and Hobbes,‖ 5. 
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century when thinkers such as Luban stress the presence of legitimacy as a 
component of sovereignty.102  
 
Quite evidently, this second, competing conception of sovereignty is more 
favourable towards a right of humanitarian intervention, while the first, statist 
conception shows a strong tendency to look at the protection and survival of 
the state as an end in itself.103  Obviously, the advent of a humanitarian 
intervention against the state itself is something a state wishes to prevent. 
Nevertheless, the liberal, Lockean conception of sovereignty too  pleads for the 
upkeep of a principle of non-intervention. As will in later times be further 
elaborated by John Stuart Mill, sovereignty – both in the Hobbesian and the 
Lockean sense – is a concept developed to establish a platform of stability, 
allowing citizens to live their lives in safety (as in Hobbes), or allowing them 
to enjoy the benefits of the rights they possess (as in Locke). Therefore, non-
intervention is presented – ironically – as a means to an end which is in many 
ways similar to that of those today pleading for a right to intervene: thanks to 
non-intervention, no mass wars would take place and no mass atrocities would 
be committed any more.  
 
However, as is now widely accepted, the presupposition on which these 
theories are constructed is in itself incorrect. The ‗collective analogy‘ whereby 
a state is equated to the sum of its individual citizens is flawed. In this analogy, 
persons and states are considered to be alike:  
Just as persons are autonomous agents, and are entitled to determine their own 
action free from interference as long as the exercise of their autonomy does not 
involve the transgression of certain moral constraints, so, it is claimed, states 
are also autonomous agents, whose autonomy is similarly deserving of 
respect.104  
As the examples of governments committing mass atrocities against their own 
population show, this analogy does not always hold. States are more if not less 
than the sum of its citizens, and they pursue objectives which can differ from, 
and go against those of its population.105 
 
This being said, the collective analogy continues to inspire liberal international 
relations theory on the question of a possible right of intervention. The double 
conception  sketched out in the above has led to the establishment of (at least) 
two competing narratives on the question of a right of intervention: a                                                         
102 Luban, ―Just war and human rights.‖ Note however, that Luban makes a distinction between an 
‗horizontal‘ social contract, which – in Lockean fashion – establishes the political community 
which is the nation, while a ‗vertical‘ contract is needed to establish a state (Ibid., 167). The 
reasoning behind this argument is not straightforward. Does it not undermine the very point he 
wishes to make, namely that sovereignty requires legitimacy?   
103 Tesón, ―The liberal case for humanitarian intervention,‖ 110. 
104 Jeff McMahan, ―The Ethics of International Intervention,‖ in Ethics and international relations, 
ed. Anthony Ellis and United States-United Kingdom Educational Commission (Manchester 
University Press ND, 1986), 28-29. 
105 Holzgrefe, Humanitarian intervention, 28. 
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communitarian and a cosmopolitan one. The former will be treated in sub-
section B, the latter in C.  
 
4.2 SOVEREIGNTY FROM A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE: A FEW 
REASONS NOT TO INTERVENE  
 
John Stuart Mill is the English philosopher who is best known for his principle 
of liberty according to which one is free to do as one pleases, as long as one 
does not harm others.106 Although liberalism was not a new phenomenon 
(Locke has already been discussed above), it gained momentum in the 19th 
century and developed into the leading intellectual tradition of that time. 
 
In a rather short article, entitled ‗A Few Words on Non-Intervention‘, Mill 
reconsidered the principle of non-intervention. Rejecting a depiction of 
England as acting solely out of self-interest (whereby he thus rejected realism), 
Mill argued that non-intervention itself was a liberal principle, a principle 
allowing citizens to acquire freedom without interference from the outside.  
 
As mentioned, according to Mill, England does not merely act out of a need to 
protect its interests. Self-interest should not be confused with the preservation 
of one‘s security. National security, Mill holds, is a precious good, and an 
intervention for reasons of self-defence is justified.107 But apart from such a 
hypothesis, are there any other reasons for which a state is morally allowed to 
intervene in another state?108  
 
In essence, Mill‘s defence of the principle of non-interventionism boils down 
to the following argument: one cannot import freedom. A people has to 
deserve its own freedom; and to acquire such freedom, its needs to fight its 
oppressors. As Mill puts it: 
The only test possessing any real value, of a people‘s having become fit for 
popular institutions, is that they (...) are willing to brave labour and danger for 
their liberation. (...) If a people (...) does not value it sufficiently to fight for it, 
and maintain it against any force which can be mustered within the country 
(...), it is only a question of how few years or months that people will be 
enslaved.109                                                         
106 John Mill, On liberty and other essays (Lawrence  Kan.: Digireads.com Publ., 2010), 21-22.  
107 John Stuart Mill, ―A few words on non-intervention,‖ New England Review (1990-) 27, no. 3 
(2006): 3. 
108 Note that Mill seems to be talking about intervention in a wider way than we have done until 
now. The use of force does not seem to be required in Mill‘s view for an action to be labelled 
‗intervention‘. Furthermore, Mill here makes a distinction between ‗barbarians‘ and ‗civilised 
peoples‘. The distinction is interesting, as it tells us quite a lot about the then prevailing 
worldview. However, it need not bother us here. Doyle has said interesting things on that point : 
M. W Doyle, ―A few words on Mill, Walzer, and nonintervention,‖ Ethics & International Affairs 
23, no. 4 (2009): 363-366. 
109 Mill, ―A few words on non-intervention,‖ 6. 
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Hence, Mill does not believe it is justified for a foreign state to intervene in 
another state to ‗liberate‘ its population. If one attempts to ‗impose‘ freedom, it 
will necessarily perish.110  
 
This being said, Mill does not regard the principle as an absolute one. In his 
article ‗A Few Words on Non-Intervention‘, he identifies two exceptions,111 
namely the case of a ‗protracted civil war‘, and that of the ‗struggle of a people 
against their government for free institutions‘. 
 
The first case is that of a ‗protracted civil war‘.112 For Mill, another state can 
intervene in such a war in two hypotheses. First, if ‗the contending parties are 
so equally balanced that there is no probability of a speedy issue‘, and second, 
‗if the victorious side cannot hope to jeep down the vanquished but by 
severities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent welfare of the 
country.‘113 The underlined words are important. They will be discussed 
below. 
 
The second case is that of ‗the struggle of a people against their government 
for free institutions‘. Here, yet another distinction can be made, Mill argues. If 
this struggle is a purely domestic one, then foreign states should not intervene. 
As mentioned, a people has to deserve its own freedom. However, if this 
struggle takes place by a people against a foreign oppressor, then the situation 
becomes completely different. Here, one is already confronted with a violation 
of the principle of non-intervention by another state. For Mill, a third state can 
then intervene in the first in order to chase the second away. The argument is 
quite clever:  
A people the most attached to freedom (...) may be unable to contend 
successfully for them against the military strength of another nation much 
more powerful. To assist a people thus kept down, is not to disturb the balance 
of forces on which the permanent maintenance of freedom in a country 
depends, but to redress that balance when it is already unfairly and violently 
disturbed.114 
In other words: Mill makes a liberal case for intervention in order for the 
liberal principle of non-intervention to survive. This position appears to be 
contradictory. However, by looking at more recent contributions, such as those 
of Michael Walzer and Michael Doyle, the seeming inconsistency is explained. 
Key to understanding it is the notion of self-determination.                                                         
110 In the advent of a foreign intervention, Mill envisages three scenarios. First, such a government, 
put in place by foreign powers, will begin to rule as the previous government; that is, as an 
oppressor. Second, the state will collapse in a civil war. Third, it will become dependent on the  
interveners for a long time. Doyle, ―A few words on Mill, Walzer, and nonintervention,‖ 353. The 
example of Iraq sufficiently illustrates this third point, I believe. 
111 In other writings, Mill develops these ideas further. For reasons of feasibility, I do not take 
these into account. See, however Ibid., 356 et seq. 
112 Mill, ―A few words on non-intervention,‖ 5. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 6. 
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As indicated by Doyle, Mill stands at the starting point of a tradition which 
came to be known as communitarianism. In this tradition, Mill‘s claim that a 
people needs to acquire its own freedom became reconceptualised: from a 
responsibility it became a right; a right we today call that of self-determination. 
This notion lies at the heart of the ambiguity within liberalism on the principle 
of non-intervention: for communitarians on the one hand, an intervention can 
be justified in order to safeguard the possibility for a people to exercise its 
right to self-determination. Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, tend to 
emphasise the need for a humanitarian commitment to assistance in the advent 
of mass atrocities and generally tend to look at sovereignty from the statist 
perspective sketched out in the above.115 
 
Within this communitarian liberal tradition, a ‗right of humanitarian 
intervention‘ is not rejected, although it is treated with restraint. Mill 
established two explicit exceptions to the principle of non-intervention. 
However, the words ‗severities repugnant to humanity‘ (underlined in the 
above) give the impression that he implicitly established a third exception as 
well. Walzer further elaborated on this third exception and made a case in 
favour of a right of humanitarian intervention whenever acts take place that 
‗shock the moral conscience of mankind‘.116  For communitarians as Walzer, 
the principle of non-intervention is important within international society, but 
in some cases, discussing the importance of a right to self-determination 
simply becomes ridiculous and cynical.117 However, such exceptions need to 
be handled with care. Communitarians are deeply concerned with the 
possibility of abuse of a right of humanitarian intervention and require a 
special ‗burden of proof‘ to allow for a humanitarian intervention to take 
place.118 
 
In sum, communitarianism is a first tradition within liberal thought upholding 
sovereignty – as did Locke – as a liberal concept. Sovereignty is presumed to 
be legitimate,119 and it lies at the basis of a principle of non-intervention,                                                         
115 Doyle, ―A few words on Mill, Walzer, and nonintervention,‖ 350. 
116 Michael Walzer, Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with historical illustrations, 4th ed. 
(New York: Basic Books, 2006), 107. 
117 Ibid., 90. 
118 In the words of Walzer: ‗Interventions are so often undertaken for ―reasons of state‖ that have 
nothing to do with self-determination that we have become sceptical of every claim to defend the 
autonomy of alien communities. Hence, the special burden of proof (...), more onerous than any 
we impose on individuals or governments pleading self-defense: intervening states must 
demonstrate that their own case is radically different from what we take to be the general run of 
cases, where the liberty (...) of citizens is best served if foreigners offer them only moral support.‘ 
Ibid., 91. 
119 Such is certainly not the case in the cosmopolitan narrative, where sovereignty is looked at with 
great suspicion. This presumption of legitimacy is perhaps the weakest point in the communitarian 
narrative. It fails to incorporate the empirical fact that in today‘s world many states lack such 
legitimacy. Unsurprisingly, cosmopolitans do not hesitate to point out this weak point.  
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which in turn is regarded as a guarantee that every community has the 
possibility to acquire its own freedom without interference by foreign powers.  
 
The difference with earlier accounts as that of Grotius is that for Mill and 
Walzer and for liberal thinkers in general, a right of intervention is claimed not 
to be derived from any particular conception of the good. Liberalism proclaims 
moral neutrality and rejects any external ‗higher norm‘. Starting from the main 
tenet that every man (and – by means of the collective analogy120 – every 
community) ought to decide how he/she lives his/her life, an intervention can 
only be justified when the events that are taking place are of such as nature that 
it is beyond doubt that no particular moral system could allow them. In a 
certain way, communitarians uphold a degree of moral relativism on a 
community level.  
 
Such a relativism distinguishes communitarianism from natural law thinking, 
epitomised by Kant‘s principle of respect; the difference lying in the 
requirement of recognition.121 In Kantian ethics, on the one hand, the validity 
of a right to intervene does not depend on its recognition by others. In a 
communitarian account, on the other hand, such a recognition is necessary. 
The conviction that no particular moral system could oppose such an 
intervention explains the need, within the communitarian paradigm, for an 
exceptionally high burden of proof. The risk of abuse is central in 
communitarian liberalism, since the very aim of an intervention is to allow 
every community to have the means to struggle for its own freedom. In a 
Kantian, natural law paradigm, less attention is given to this idea of communal 
liberty. The unacceptability of a certain set of events is already ascertained a 
priori and is not based on the conclusion of a hypothetical contract. Therefore, 
it can be imagined that those adhering to the natural law tradition will be more 
willing to intervene than those adhering to communitarian liberalism.122 This 
point will reappear in section IV on cosmopolitanism. 
 
                                                        
120 Cf. supra. 
121 Such was also the argument of Nardin. See Nardin, ―The Moral Basis of Humanitarian 
Intervention,‖ 64. 
122 The risk of abuse which a human rights based account of humanitarian intervention entails, has 
always been a central argument in favour of the  communitarian principle of non-intervention. 
Today as well, with the cosmopolitan narrative becoming the dominant one, concerns are still 
raised. American interventionism under the Bush administration has provoked quite some thought. 
Fierce defenders of interventionism were very active in these days (think of Tesón, ―The liberal 
case for humanitarian intervention.‖), but reactions did not fail to come (Terry Nardin, 
―Humanitarian Imperialism,‖ Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (September 2005): 21-26, 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00497.x.). Coming from the critical tradition, a 
debate emerged on the use of the humanitarian intervention doctrine in support of possible 
imperial ambitions from the part of the US. For a discussion, see Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?‖. 
and for a leading work in the debate, see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard 
University Press, 2001).  
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Mill conceived sovereignty as a progressive, egalitarian concept.123 This article 
claims that this conception underlies the UN legal framework as laid down in 
the UN Charter as well. The way in which sovereignty is referred to already 
gives a hint as to the way it was intended to be conceived: the Charter speaks 
of the ‗sovereign equality of all its Members‘. The international community is 
thus depicted as a club of friends which stand on an equal footing. The Charter 
legally entrenches this idea of equality and thus creates a possible 
counterweight for the material imbalance that obviously exists between the 
different states. The right of self-determination plays a central role in that 
regard. If one looks at the UN General Assembly Resolutions on the issue of 
colonialism, the rationale underpinning the UN framework clearly shines 
through:  
Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination of all peoples...124 
Let there thus be no doubt: the international system as laid down by the UN 
Charter is meant to be an egalitarian one.125  
 
4.3. COSMOPOLITANISM: REPLACING SOVEREIGNTY WITH HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
When reading the article ‗Just War and Human Rights‘ by David Luban,126 one 
is confronted with quite a different vision on sovereignty and its corollary, the 
principle of non-intervention. While communitarians such as Mill and Walzer 
regard sovereignty as the conditio sine qua non for a people to be self-
determining, cosmopolitans as Luban but also Anne-Marie Slaughter,127 as 
well as Buchanan and Keohane128 consider sovereignty to be the main 
impediment for people to live their life in a decent manner, with their basic 
human rights respected. While communitarians seem to take the liberal 
conception of sovereignty for granted, cosmopolitans are sceptical towards 
sovereignty as it risks being abused by the states. 
 
Luban rejects non-interventionism. In his article, he remarks that the 
communitarian justification of sovereignty and non-intervention, even if in 
abstracto it would make sense, fails to provide for a useful theory of just war                                                         
123 Koskenniemi, From apology to utopia, 237. 
124 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, Declaration of the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 December 1960. 
125 Chris Brown, Sovereignty, rights and justice: international political theory today (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2002), 145. 
126 Luban, ―Just war and human rights.‖ 
127 A. M Slaughter and W. Burke-White, ―An International Constitutional Moment,‖ Harvard 
International Law Journal 43, no. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 
(Princeton University Press, 2005). 
128 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ―The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan 
Institutional Proposal,‖ Ethics & International Affairs 18, no. 1 (March 2004): 1-22, 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2004.tb00447.x. 
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in today‘s world, if only because today‘s world dramatically differs from that 
of thinkers such as Mill. While the international community in the 19th century 
consisted of a limited number of nation-states, today‘s world has quite a 
number of states which claim to enjoy the benefits of sovereignty, but which 
actually fail to meet the requirements to be considered sovereign as put 
forward by Locke.129 Therefore, cosmopolitans reject the presumptive 
legitimacy of sovereignty upheld in communitarian thought. In general, their 
perception of sovereignty leans very closely to the statist one sketched in the 
above.  
 
To get around this wrongful focus on states and the accompanying ambiguity – 
a focus which became part of the UN legal framework in which every act of 
aggression ipso facto becomes illegal (unless it is a case of self-defence130 or if 
it is authorised by the UN Security Council131) – Luban wishes to abandon the 
statist paradigm, and instead look into a human rights one.132 If we by-pass the 
state, he argues, and instead focus on the rights of the men and women who 
make up the state, we can come to a more fertile moral ground upon which the 
debate on the possibility of a just war can be held.133  
 
A right is a claim of one person on another, Luban holds. Human rights are 
claims of the whole human community on the whole of the human 
community.134 It is possible to make distinctions between different human 
rights, Luban seems to indicate. Some of them are considered to be socially 
basic human rights.135 Examples of these are subsistence rights (right to 
healthy air and water, adequate food, clothing and shelter) and security rights 
(right not to be subject to killing, torture, assault...).136 For Luban, it is justified 
to go to war to defend such rights (even in defence of the human rights of 
others, not living in the same state).137 Here as well, a condition of 
proportionality is present, but the impression is given that this safety measure 
plays a less prominent role than in communitarian discourse.138  
 
                                                         
129 Luban, ―Just war and human rights,‖ 172. 
130 Article 51 UN Charter. 
131 Chapter VII UN Charter. 
132 Luban, ―Just war and human rights,‖ 174. 
133 Ibid., 187. 
134 Ibid., 174. See also the reference to Amartya Sen in footnote 85 above. 
135 In the words of Henry Shue : ‗Socially basic human rights are everyone‘s minimum reasonable 
demands upon the rest of humanity.‘ (Ibid., 175.) This notion of ‗basic human rights‘ was further 
developed by Shue in his book Basic rights: subsistence, affluence, and U.S. foreign policy 
(Princeton University Press, 1996). It continues to inspire the debate, as illustrated by a recent 
collection of essays: Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin, Global basic rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
136 Luban, ―Just war and human rights,‖ 175. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Cf. infra.  
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4.4 EVALUATION: WHY SOVEREIGNTY ISN‘T ALL BAD  
 
When examining the transformation of the discourse on humanitarian 
intervention which has taken place in recent years and has led to the rise of 
cosmopolitanism, the important role played by human rights can hardly be 
overlooked. As indicated by Teitel, humanitarian law has merged with 
international human rights discourse.139 From an evolutionary perspective, it 
seems that natural law discourse (cf. Grotius) lost much of its appeal as 
Millian, communitarian liberalism grew in importance. While liberalism did 
presuppose the existence of a set of civil rights140 natural law discourse 
nevertheless was snowed under by the focus on moral neutrality characterising 
the liberal narrative.  
 
Being confronted with the deadlock in which the UN collective security 
system was trapped during the Cold War, this communitarian liberal narrative 
in turn came to be attacked. Sovereignty came to be seen as the main 
impediment for the international community to intervene when faced with 
events that ‗shock the moral conscience of mankind‘.141 This perception 
became general, as even the former UN Secretary-General agreed.142 As a way 
to get out of this deadlock, philosophers and lawyers alike started looking for 
alternatives. The most obvious alternative for the liberal communitarian 
narrative in which non-intervention played such an important role was natural 
law thinking, a tradition which as mentioned already took on the clothes of a 
human rights discourse.143  
 
However, this turn to human rights has far-reaching consequences. In the UN 
legal system, the communitarian narrative on sovereignty was entrenched into 
formal international law. As will be further developed in the following section, 
by rejecting sovereignty, cosmopolitans ipso facto rejected formal international 
law in its entirety.144 Walzer, in his 1977 book talked of the ‗legalist 
paradigm‘.145 It was this ‗legalist‘ conception of sovereignty that prevented the 
international community from acting. The cosmopolitan narrative thus 
acquired a new dimension: it not only pleaded against sovereignty, but in one                                                         
139 Teitel, ―Humanity‘s Law.‖ 
140 In Lockean contract theory the state is seen as a means to allow its citizens to enjoy the benefits 
of these rights. 
141 Walzer, Just and unjust wars, 107. 
142 In his acceptance speech of the Nobel Peace prize of 2001 he said that ‗the sovereignty of states 
must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights.‘ (Kofi Annan, speech 
given to the Nobel Foundation, Oslo, Norway, 10 December 2001; available at 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2001/annan-lecture.html. (last accessed on 25 
June 2011)). 
143 I come back to this evolution when presenting Koskenniemi‘s article on a ‗turn to ethics‘. Cf. 
infra.  
144 On the de-formalisation of international law and the subsequent ‗turn to ethics‘, see 
Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International 
Law.‖ Cohen mentioned this as well: Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?,‖ 7. 
145 Walzer, Just and unjust wars, 58 et seq.  
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sweep wished to get rid of international law all together. The Kosovo case is 
particularly enlightening in that regard. All observers agree that the 
intervention without UN mandate was illegal. Nevertheless, these same 
observers argue that, even though illegal, it nevertheless was legitimate.146 
Some even went as far as to argue that out of such illegal acts an international 
custom can come forth and that legality needs to be breached for law to 
develop.147  
 
It is submitted that this move away from sovereignty and away from formalism 
in international law must be regarded with great suspicion. The alternative 
international legal regime which is presented by cosmopolitans has one major 
disadvantage. By rejecting sovereignty and its corollary, non-intervention, as 
well as by rejecting the formal legal system which mitigates the power struggle 
taking place between states, one opens the door for imperialist adventures.148 
The sovereign equality of states has on many occasions functioned as an 
ultimate defence against foreign interference. Even if this defence is merely 
discursive, its force should not be underestimated as it creates a relationship 
between the intervening state and the attacked state as one of ‗trespasser‘ and 
‗victim‘.149 The burden of proof here lies with the intervening state: it needs to 
have strong reasons to intervene.150 Taking away this defence would lead to 
limitless interventionism by a limited number of states. Justifications for 
intervention would boil down to ex post apologies.151  
 
However, this is not to say that communitarianism does not have its 
downsides. While non-intervention has indeed functioned as a barrier against 
imperialism, one should not forget that the cosmopolitan reproach holding that 
sovereignty often functions as a shield used by dictators against outside 
interference does hold water.152 Today, the presupposition on which 
communitarianism is founded can be questioned. Legitimacy can no longer be 
assumed. Furthermore, the role attributed to the right of self-determination has 
a problematic side to it as well. The emphasis on self-determination begs the                                                         
146 See, on this point, Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to 
Ethics in International Law,‖ 162. and also Chesterman, Just war or just peace?, 231. 
147 See here A Cassese, ―Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of 
forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?,‖ European Journal of 
International Law 10, no. 1 (1999): 23. The argument that illegal acts are sometimes necessary to 
make the law evolve, is strongly inspired by the ideas developed by Hannah Arendt on ‗civil 
disobedience‘. See Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic: lying in politics, civil disobedience on 
violence, thoughts on politics, and revolution (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972). 
148 See Teitel, who warned against this risk of abuse: ‗The fact that the same norms can pull in 
potentially conflicting directions underscores the indeterminacy and extent to which the global rule 
of law, as it is currently framed, constitutes a highly manipulable regime that lends itself to 
politicization.‘ (Teitel, ―Humanity‘s Law,‖ 387). 
149 Michel Foucault,  ’archéologie du savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). 
150 I refer to the quote from Walzer mentioned supra. See Walzer, Just and unjust wars, 91.  
151 See, for example, Tesón‘s plea in favour of the intervention in Iraq in Tesón, ―Ending tyranny 
in Iraq.‖ 
152 On this point, see Luban, ―Just war and human rights,‖ 173. and footnote 129. 
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question: what exactly constitutes a people? Attributing a big role to people 
leads to a risk of focussing all together too much on ethnicity; an emphasis 
which has the paradoxical potential of nurturing internal strife.153  
 
Does this imply then that sovereignty ought to be abandoned altogether? The 
risk of ending up in a utilitarian calculus lurks around the corner.154 What has 
caused the most harm in the past? Interventionism or non-interventionism? 
Apart from the fact that this is a calculation impossible to make, it also entails 
the risk of getting stuck in serious dichotomous reasoning.155 Are there not 
alternatives to the cosmopolitan cry for a sovereignty-free world? Can we not 
save sovereignty (this article claims we should) and provide for a right or even 
a duty to intervene, without running the risk of unwillingly opening the door 
for imperialism and abuse?  
 
To avoid any misunderstanding, this article does not reject cosmopolitanism in 
its entirety. What is troubling, however, is the fact that cosmopolitan thinkers 
tend to take their wishes for reality. Cosmopolitan thinkers such as Anne-
Marie Slaughter156 claim that the cosmopolitan legal order is already installed. 
This is hardly the case. While there are elements of a ‗global rule of law‘ (one 
can think of the role of the International Criminal Court), it is nevertheless 
hard to ignore the fact that states are still the predominant actors in the 
international community.157 Ignoring this point is to give states carte blanche. 
Blinded by an ambiance of utopia, the risk of abuse of the legal system by the 
states will disappear from the radar of international law.  
 
This is the challenge R2P was intended to address. The following section 
examines in the light of the foregoing analysis to what extent (if any) R2P has 
pushed this debate further.  
 
5. R2P: ‘OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES’?  
 
The exploration of the different narratives on a right/duty of humanitarian 
intervention leads to the conundrum which international law as well as 
international ethics face today: is it possible to design a legal regime which 
allows for a right to intervene or even imposes a duty to intervene, while at the 
same time limiting as much as possible the risks of abuse?  
                                                         
153 I believe there is a strong tension within the UN legal framework between, on the one side, the 
discourse on self-determination and, on the other side, the discourse pleading for international 
stability and peace. Self-determination hereby paradoxically undermines the very objectives of the 
discourse of which it forms part; a discourse aimed at establishing a stable world order.  
154 On the role of utilitarianism in the humanitarian intervention debate, see Holzgrefe, 
Humanitarian intervention, 20-25. 
155 Susan Marks, The riddle of all constitutions : international law, democracy, and the critique of 
ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 22. 
156 Slaughter, A New World Order. 
157 Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?,‖ 12. 
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R2P as presented in section I has three pillars. First, a responsibility of every 
state to protect its population from the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as from their 
incitement. Second, a responsibility of the international community to assist a 
state to fulfil its R2P. Third, a responsibility of the international community to 
take timely and decisive action, in accordance with the UN Charter, in cases 
where the state has manifestly failed to protect its population from one or more 
of the four crimes.158 
 
Stahn identified two interesting elements which form part of R2P: a conception 
of sovereignty as responsibility and the establishment of a duty to intervene in 
the name of human security.159 With the information gathered in the previous 
sections, we can now explain these elements. 
 
As for sovereignty-as-responsibility, a first hypothesis is to look at it as a 
rejection of the cosmopolitan and thus statist conception of sovereignty and a 
return to the communitarian conception which is – as mentioned earlier – a 
progressive and egalitarian one. This tradition which gained momentum in the 
19th century (think of Mill) can actually be traced back to Locke and his liberal 
social contract theory. R2P, by presenting sovereignty as entailing a set of 
responsibilities, thus at first sight seems to go back to this communitarian 
conception.160  
 
However, there is one big difference with the communitarian narrative: while 
in communitarianism and in Lockean liberalism, legitimacy needs to stem 
from the inside, R2P makes the legitimacy of sovereignty dependent on the 
outside. This would come down to a significant reconceptualisation of 
sovereignty: a state will be considered legitimate and thus be sovereign as long 
as the international community deems it worthy to be sovereign.161 This point 
in fact shows that R2P and the link installed between sovereignty and 
responsibility is of quite a different nature than one would expect at first sight. 
With the foundation of legitimacy lying at the international level, R2P 
suddenly reveals itself as a form of disguised cosmopolitanism. Sovereignty is 
automatically trumped by human rights considerations.162 
 
Indeed, R2P is conceivably more a cosmopolitan than a communitarian 
concept. It pays lip service to sovereignty, but in between the lines one cannot                                                         
158 UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009, A/63/677. 
159 Stahn, ―Responsibility to Protect,‖ 110 et seq. 
160 Such was also the idea of Stahn, who she herself referred to Locke. See Ibid., 111. 
161 Alvarez, in his article ‗The Schizophrenias of R2P‘ referred to the words of Richard Haas who 
talked about sovereignty in the R2P discourse as being a bumper sticker saying ‗abuse it and lose 
it‘. Alvarez continues by saying that ‗R2P supporters may object to his lack of nuance, but they 
can hardly claim his bumper sticker violates the core idea that (...) statehood only has an 
‗instrumental‘ rather than an ‗intrinsic‘ value‘. See Alvarez, ―The Schizophrenias of R2P,‖ 179. 
162 For a clear example of this cosmopolitan way of reasoning, see Tan, ―The Duty to Protect,‖ 3-6. 
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but notice a perception of sovereignty as being part of the problem instead of 
the solution.  
 
Especially revealing in that respect is the presentation of sovereignty by Gareth 
Evans, the main promoter of R2P and president of the ICISS.163 In his book 
The Responsibility to Protect, he equates sovereignty with the statist 
conception of it. He goes back to the Peace of Westphalia, and presents 
sovereignty as a principle which  
effectively institutionalized the long-standing indifference of political rulers 
toward atrocity crimes occurring elsewhere, and also effectively immunized 
them from any external discipline they might conceivably have faced for either 
perpetrating such crimes against their own people or allowing others to commit 
them while they stood by.164  
He then continues by listing the number of mass atrocities having been 
committed in the twentieth century. In short, Evans presents a thoroughly one-
sided picture of sovereignty. Equating it with its statist conception, and 
ignoring the link made in the UN Charter between, on the one hand, non-
intervention and, on the other hand, the system of collective security,165 Evans 
puts all his eggs in the basked of a human rights discourse, a discourse he 
regards as the tool par excellence to by-pass the state-centred, cynical system 
which has led to such massive bloodshed.166 Evans, the driving force behind 
R2P, is a firm supporter of the cosmopolitan narrative.  
 
The idea of human security, to which the notion of a responsibility of all states 
to act when the state committing mass atrocities loses its sovereignty, again 
confirms the nature of R2P as a cosmopolitan concept. As mentioned by Jean 
Cohen, human security is presented by R2P as the new Grundnorm of 
international law.167 Sovereignty and the state-centred paradigm that goes with 
it have to go, and the focus of international law has to shift towards the 
individual right to live a safe life.168  
                                                         
163 See, in general, Evans, The responsibility to protect, chap. 1. 
164 Ibid., 16. 
165 In defence of sovereignty, see Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?‖, to whom I will come back later 
on.  
166 Evans, The responsibility to protect, 19-20. Revealing is the use of the words ‗our common 
humanity‘ (Ibid., 17.) indicating the ‗turn to ethics‘ as described by Koskenniemi in ―‗The Lady 
Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law.‖ 
167 Hans Kelsen, Pure theory of law, California Library reprint series ed. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978). 
168 See Buchanan and Keohane, ―The Preventive Use of Force,‖ 4. and also Cohen, ―Whose 
Sovereignty?,‖ 5. Cohen also identified a number of other concepts put forth to replace 
sovereignty. She refers to Walzer‘s idea of a ‗human right to protection‘ (Michael Walzer, ―Au-
delà de l‘intervention humanitaire: les droits de l‘homme dans la société globale,‖ Esprit, 2004.) 
and to the principle of ‗civilian inviolability‘ as presented by Anne-Marie Slaughter and William 
Burke-White in ―An International Constitutional Moment.‖ and further developed in Slaughter, A 
New World Order. Notice the shift in Walzer‘s thought: he too has fallen for the temptation of 
cosmopolitanism. 
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R2P, being a cosmopolitan concept, falls into the same traps as do other 
versions of the cosmopolitan narrative: it opens the door for abuse. Alvarez, in 
his article with the telling title ‗The Schizophrenias of R2P‘ pointed out that 
since its conception, R2P has been used in a wide series of circumstances.169 
Not all of the examples Alvarez puts forward are convincing,170 but some of 
them certainly are. He refers, for example, to Anne-Marie Slaugther (whom 
was already mentioned earlier on) and Lee Feinstein who built upon R2P to 
develop a duty to intervene to prevent states from acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction.171 Another, even more significant example is the article written by 
Fernando Tesón, in which he makes an attempt to justify ex post the Iraq 
invasion by claiming the main motivation was a humanitarian one.172 In his 
argument, he refers several times to the work of the ICISS and to R2P.173  
 
To understand in what way R2P allows for abuse, it is interesting to refer back 
to the critique of scholars as Koskenniemi and Cohen on cosmopolitanism. 
Their account allows one to pinpoint where exactly R2P becomes problematic. 
 
Koskenniemi, in his article ‘‖The Lady Doth Protest Too much‖ Kosovo, and 
the Turn to Ethics in International Law‘ described with extraordinary clarity an 
evolution which has taken place in post-Cold War international law. From the 
desire to bring exceptional cases (such as the humanitarian intervention 
debate) into the realm of normality (whereby Koskenniemi means, the law), 
the scope of what is regarded as law expanded dramatically. At the same time, 
however, its nature changed along. From formal international law, 
Koskenniemi identified a movement towards individual, personal and even 
emotional morality; a movement he called a ‗turn to ethics‘. We no longer rely 
on formal legal rules, but came to regard decisions on the (lack of) necessity to 
intervene as personal, moral choices. This evolution is troubling, Koskenniemi 
argues, as it turns out to be the fulfilment of what Carl Schmitt proclaimed 
already seventy years ago.174 In Koskenniemi‘s words: 
For [Schmitt], legal normality was dependent on the power of the one who 
could decide on the exception: legal normality – rules and processes – was 
only a surface appearance of the concrete order that revealed its character in 
the dramatic moment when normality was to be defended or set aside.175                                                         
169 Alvarez, ―The Schizophrenias of R2P,‖ 277-278. 
170 He refers, for example to the cosmopolitan theory for intervention as developed in Buchanan 
and Keohane, ―The Preventive Use of Force.‖ Nowhere is there any reference made to R2P 
whatsoever.  
171 Feinstein and Slaughter, ―A duty to prevent.‖ 
172 Tesón, ―Ending tyranny in Iraq.‖ This article is to me the clearest example of the tendency of 
international legal doctrine and theory to develop apologies of state action. On this topic, see 
Koskenniemi, From apology to utopia. 
173 Tesón, ―Ending tyranny in Iraq,‖ 4, 14, 17, 19. 
174 Carl Schmitt and George Schwab, Political theology: four chapters on the concept of 
sovereignty (University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
175 Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law,‖ 171. 
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The ‗turn to ethics‘ has brought us to this situation: the solution of 
international humanitarian crises does not depend on the proper application of 
legal rules, but instead on the moral conscience of the leaders of the Western 
world. Serbia was bombarded in 1999 because – as argued by Mr. Blair – the 
international community had a ‗moral duty‘ to do so.  
 
Koskenniemi describes the rhetorical processes which have brought us to this 
situation.  
In a first step, formal law came to be questioned. Focus shifted from the 
application of law to its interpretation. From interpretation, attention shifted to 
the ‗‖underlying‖ social, historical, systemic or other such ―values‖.‘176 In a 
third step, international law was made dependent on the objective it was 
designed to serve. ‘If law is just a ‖practical guide‖ to reach a point, then we 
have no need for it if we already know the point,‘ the argument went.177 In a 
fourth step, having now already rejected formal international law, decisions on 
the question whether or not to intervene become a matter of utilitarian 
calculus. But, looking at the Kosovo example, how can such a calculus be 
made? What are the relevant values? What is the ratio? Do 500 civilian 
casualties weigh more than 100 military victims? From criticism on such cold 
calculations, in a fifth step the focus shifted towards human rights. It is in the 
name of human rights that states ought to intervene. However, such rights are 
not absolute. They ‗depend on their meaning and force on the character of the 
political community in which they function‘.178 What do we regard as a severe 
violation of human rights? When does a situation become a humanitarian 
crisis? These are not objective observations; they depend to a large extent on 
what the intervening state thinks of as important. Such considerations thus, 
again, boil down to utilitarian calculus. The problem is not solved. Therefore, a 
sixth step is made. Attempts are made to legislate the problem away. Rules and 
principles179 are designed in which criteria are incorporated; criteria which tell 
us when and how to intervene. However,  
this is to restate the difficulty with rules. However enlightened, peaceful and 
rational the appliers are, rules cannot be applied in the automatic fashion that 
their proponents suppose. This is because any rule or criterion will be both 
over and under-inclusive.180 
An automatic criterion would be impossible anyway, for it would be a ‗trap for 
the innocent and a signpost for the guilty,‘ Koskenniemi – drawing from Stone 
                                                        
176 Ibid., 163. 
177 Ibid., 165. 
178 Ibid., 167. 
179 By principles, we need to think of the concept as developed by Dworkin in Ronald Dworkin, 
Taking rights seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
180 Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law,‖ 167. Koskenniemi hereby indicates not to follow Dworkin‘s theory, I believe. 
Principles are not the solution for the problem an automatic application of rules create. 
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– mentions.181 Thus, criteria are designed that are necessarily vague and open-
ended.182 If so, can we then not limit the task of international law to that of 
providing a decision-making process that allows controlled treatment of the 
situation? In the last-but-one step, this option is also wiped off the table. What 
procedure would that be then? Some still look at the UN Security Council as 
the sole organ capable of dealing with these ‗exceptional‘ cases. Others find 
that regional organisations have sufficient legitimacy to intervene.183 Yet 
others believe in ad hoc coalitions. Because of this ongoing disagreement, a 
different kind of agreement arises: there is no need for a procedure, it is held. 
Koskenniemi says:  
if formal law is anyway unclear and cannot be separated from how it is 
interpreted, then much speaks for the individualisation of Kosovo. A decision 
has to be made and that decision – as (...) Carl Schmitt (...) would say – is born 
out of legal nothingness.184 
Such is the situation we are in today. The ideal of a Rule of Law appears to be 
thrown overboard by the supporters of R2P. Instead, the answer to the question 
whether states have to intervene or not depends on the individual moral 
judgment of their leaders; and for this judgment, international law yields. 
Kosovo for a moment revealed this: 
[it] was the exception that revealed, for a moment, the nature of the 
international order which lay not in the Charter of the United Nations nor in 
principles of humanitarianism but in the will and power of a handful of 
Western civilian and military leaders.185  
Koskenniemi‘s argument was presented at length, as R2P fits remarkably well 
in the picture he sketched. The return to medieval just war theory,186 the trust 
in criteria as ‗just cause‘ and ‗right authority‘187 are the missing link for 
international law to become dependent on what political leaders conceive as 
their ‗moral duty‘.  
 
                                                        
181 Julius Stone, Conflict through consensus: United Nations approaches to aggression (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977); Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and 
the Turn to Ethics in International Law,‖ 167. 
182 The comparison was here made with the search for a definition of ‗aggression‘. A UN General 
Assembly Resolution (UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) 14 December 1974) listed a long series of cases 
which should be considered aggression, but finished by saying that ‗the Security Council may 
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter‘. What is the 
use of such a definition then? The same accounts for R2P. The concept has elements which are 
necessarily open-ended. See Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the 
Turn to Ethics in International Law,‖ 168. 
183 Such was the case in Kosovo. 
184 Schmitt and Schwab, Political theology, 31-32; Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too 
Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law,‖ 170. 
185 ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law,‖ 
171. 
186 A point Evans does not hide. See Evans, The responsibility to protect, 140. 
187 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect, XII. 
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How well intended the efforts of the members of the ICISS and the army of 
scholars who have taken great pains in further developing R2P might have 
been,188 a solution for the problems international law faces today in relation 
with the conundrum humanitarian intervention has become, cannot be found in 
R2P since this concept falls in the same trap as other cosmopolitan concepts 
and theories. 
 
What this shows, is two things.  
 
First, one should not ask too much from international law. One cannot legislate 
genocide away; one cannot simply proclaim sovereignty as a responsibility.189 
Instead, the real problem – and unsurprisingly, Koskenniemi mentioned this as 
well190 – is the profound inequality which continues to exist in this world. As 
long as ‗failed states‘ dot the face of the earth, atrocities will continue to take 
place. Dictators live of the misery of their population. Here, a severe hypocrisy 
can be found: these same states that cry outrage when facing genocide and 
ethnic cleansing (this is not to say that such outrage is unjustified), in many 
cases were the biggest sponsors of such regimes.191 Thus, the top-down efforts 
made today need to be seen in connection with bottom-up strategies to tackle 
the fundamental problems these ‗failed states‘ face.  
 
Obviously, this suggestion does not bring us very far in the short run. Poverty 
will not be eradicated in the near future. However, here R2P makes a second 
error: R2P rejects sovereignty, and consequently rejects the UN collective 
system of security which is seen as too state-centred. A Leitmotiv in 
cosmopolitan accounts on intervention is the fact that the UN Security Council 
does not function the way it should.192 Because hopes of reform of the Security 
Council are low, cosmopolitans thus look for alternatives. R2P does so as well. 
While in the ICISS report the Security Council is presented as the primary 
locus for decision-making on the question of a military intervention, the report 
                                                        
188 See, for an impression, the website of the Australian foreign ministry, where a 2009 
announcement mentions a AUS$4,5 million support package is announced to further develop 
R2P ; $1,8 million is granted to the ‗Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect‘ based at 
the University of Queensland. In 2008, the same ministry already granted $2 million to the 
‗Australian Responsibility to Protect Fund‘, this to ‗advance the R2P concept and help states build 
capacity to protect their own civilians.‘ See http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2009/fa-
s090721b.html (last accessed on 27 June 2011). 
189 Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?,‖ 23. 
190 Koskenniemi, ―‗The Lady Doth Protest Too Much‘ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law,‖ 172. 
191 A reference to the support the US provided Iraq in fighting Iran in the 1980s might already 
suffice to make this point.  
192 For R2P, see Evans, Responsibility to protect. Ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all, 
n.d., 146 et seq. For another cosmopolitan example, see Buchanan and Keohane, ―The Preventive 
Use of Force.‖ Where the authors propose alternatives to what they call the ‗Legal Status Quo‘. 
They think, for example, of an abolishment of the veto in the Security Council, or of the creation 
of a community of democratic states which would function in parallel with the Security Council.  
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does not exclude other procedures.193  A hierarchy of decision-making fora is 
presented. If the Security Council fails to act, the UN General Assembly must 
intervene by means of the Uniting for Peace resolution.194 If that track fails as 
well, regional organisations such as NATO or the AU could act.195 As a last 
resort, ad hoc coalitions are also considered an option.196 Hence, R2P rejects 
the cornerstone of the UN system of collective security, namely the monopoly 
for the Security Council to decide on the use of force. By investigating these 
options, the need for reform of the Security Council no longer gets the 
attention it is in dire need of.197 R2P (and cosmopolitanism in general) gives 
up on the UN. As interventions without UN Security Council mandate grow in 
number, the legitimacy which used to be the Security Council‘s strongest asset 
will be further undermined. Here as well, a form of hypocrisy can be found: 
States who invoke their moral duty to intervene without a UN Security Council 
mandate are the same states that refuse to give up their veto as a member of the 
Permanent Five and thus are they themselves responsible for the paralysis of 
the UN collective security system.198 
 
In sum, R2P is a continuation of an ongoing, double movement in international 
legal discourse. First, it turns away from formalism and instead relies on the 
individual moral appreciations of political leaders. Second, but in a way 
ingrained in the first point, it turns away from the sovereignty paradigm on 
which the UN collective security system is based. The argument put forward in 
this paper was that both movements are to be rejected as they inevitably lead to 
abuse. R2P, unfortunately, fails to provide a remedy. 
 
However, stopping here would be unsatisfactory. Are there not alternatives to 
the ‗turn to ethics‘, and the move away from sovereignty? A few suggestions 
will be given in the final section of this paper.                                                          
193 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect, 48. 
194 Ibid., 53. See UNGA Res. 377 (V), 3 November 1950. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Here, the ICISS acknowledges the difficulty in allowing an ad hoc coalition to intervene. It 
rejects nor allows such an intervention in any direct way, but indirectly the message is clear. The 
Commission raises the familiar question: ‗It is a real question where lies the most harm: in the 
damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if 
human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by‘. (Ibid., 55) Again, the ICISS 
appeals to ‗the moral conscience of mankind‘ (Walzer, Just and unjust wars, 72), but by doing so 
falls into the utilitarian trap: the choice is not or-or; it should be and-and. We need to save the role 
of the Security Council and the lives at stake on the field. 
197 In that respect, it was perhaps revealing to note that many states have been eager to take over 
the R2P discourse, as long as it remained voluntary and did not acquire any legal status. I refer to 
the vague language used in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit ; a language 
walking on the line between legal and political discourse (see on this point Stahn, ―Responsibility 
to Protect.‖). Evans pointed to the arguments of a number of governments who interpreted the 
Outcome Document as a rejection of R2P instead of an acceptance of it. See Evans, The 
responsibility to protect, 52. 
197 Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?,‖ 23. 
198 Ibid. 
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6. BEYOND R2P: OR HOW TO PUSH THE DEBATE 
FURTHER 
 
Having revealed R2P as a next step of the cosmopolitan project, and having 
rejected cosmopolitanism‘s project of abandoning sovereignty, the question in 
need of answering is now this: what else can we do? This article argues that 
there is work to be done on two fronts. First, on the front of the restoration of 
formal international law. The project of international law as started by the UN 
Charter should not be abandoned. Second, it should be realised that legitimacy 
cannot be imposed from the outside, but can only be established from the 
inside; that is through a bottom-up process. Proclaiming sovereignty as a 
responsibility simply will not do. 
 
Taking Koskenniemi‘s critique as a starting point, Jean Cohen in her article 
‗Whose Sovereignty?‘ gives us an indication of the way in which the debate on 
a right to intervene might evolve in the future. 
 
It is perhaps ironic to witness that after having seen a rise of cosmopolitan 
discourse in the last couple of decades, Cohen‘s article can be interpreted as a 
return to Millian, communitarian sovereignty-thinking. In the article, Cohen – 
without referring to Mill, but with clear references to the rationale 
underpinning the UN Charter – reminds us of the advantages of an 
international legal system built around the concepts of sovereignty and non-
intervention. She stresses the egalitarian, progressive side of sovereignty and 
rejects the statist vision on it. 
 
At the end of her article, Cohen formulates a series of proposals intended to 
push the debate further. A first, obvious step is the rejection of statism. She 
proposes to leave behind us the ‗absolutist and decisionistic concept of 
sovereignty in favour of the relational model.‘199 By this first step, Cohen 
immediately attacks the main presupposition on which cosmopolitanism is 
based. In a next step, she reintroduces the Millian conception of the 
international society as a club of equal friends: ‗the articulation of sovereignty 
within a community of states that decides to consider one another as equals is 
the political precondition for feasible and effective international law.‘ In other 
words, due to sovereignty, the material inequality between states is partly 
countered by the voluntary adherence of all states to a scheme in which every 
state is considered equal. In short, Cohen rehabilitates the idea of an 
international community based on the collective analogy. The various states 
agree to be part of that community by adhering to the UN charter which 
proclaims respect for sovereign equality, but also human rights. 
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Subsequently, Cohen points out the benefits of sovereignty when it comes to 
the possibilities for a people to acquire political freedom. What she appears to 
do is to reconstruct the right of self-determination. She no longer regards self-
determination as the right of oppressed peoples to remove the yoke of 
colonialism, but goes back to the original conception proposed by Mill in the 
previous century. Sovereignty creates the necessary conditions for a people to 
acquire political freedom, and thus ‗popular sovereignty‘. In a cosmopolitan 
world order in which states no longer exist (or at least no longer play the first 
fiddle200) it is hard to see on what platform democracy can develop. The 
question is complex, and leads us to the debate on the (non-)existence, or the 
(absence of) necessity of a single demos for democracy to function.201 Cohen 
does not seem to believe in something as a ‗global democracy‘ and instead 
sees the national arena as the preferred platform to establish a system of 
democratic accountability.202 
 
Together with the rehabilitation of sovereignty, Cohen wishes to reinforce 
international law. Instead of relying on a ‗law of humanitarian intervention‘,203 
a law which Cohen believes does not exist,204 investments should be made in 
the reform of international law itself.205 Cohen here refuses to go along in the 
R2P-project of ‗postulating a human right to (...) security‘.206 In line with the 
remarks made in the above, Cohen points out that the current focus on such a 
de-formalised international law ‗has undermined existing international law,‘ 
and shows ‗how it is being used to block the creation of new, coherent, legal 
rules that could and should regulate humanitarian intervention in ways that 
respect the principle of sovereign equality‘.207 In other words, Cohen agrees 
with Koskenniemi when he warns against the dangers of too much trust in 
moral philosophy when it comes to the question of a military intervention. In a                                                         
200 As argued by Slaughter in Slaughter, A New World Order, Introduction.  
201 A question which in the European context is very much debated. An interesting read on this 
topic is Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (Columbia University Press, 2001).  
202 Be aware that Cohen does not conceive of this principle of popular sovereignty as a human 
right; an idea defended in W. Michael Reisman, ―Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
international Law,‖ American Journal of International Law 84, no. 4 (1990): 866-876. A military 
intervention can never be intended as a means to ‗spread democracy‘, as proposed in Buchanan 
and Keohane, ―The Preventive Use of Force.‖ 
203 Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?,‖ 22. 
204 We can here refer to the debate on whether an international custom in favour of a ‗right of 
humanitarian‘ does or does not exist. Chesterman concluded the following on this point: ‗analysis 
of the relevant state practice is confused by the imprecise use of the term ‗intervention‘ and the 
failure to distinguish humanitarian concerns from other motives, with the result that few (if any) 
bona fides examples of humanitarian intervention can be discerned.‘ See Simon Chesterman, Just 
war or just peace? : humanitarian intervention and international law (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 42. 
205 In her own words: ‗We do not have a global rule of law today or a constitutionalised 
international order, but we do have hard international law that can be developed in the right 
direction.‘ See Cohen, ―Whose Sovereignty?,‖ 23. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
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telling footnote, she holds that ‗moral philosophy cannot adjudicate among 
these different lists of ―fundamental‖ human rights.‘208 
 
What should be done instead, is a thorough reform of the UN itself. The 
Security Council needs to be made more accountable; something that can be 
done by expanding the permanent membership of the Council to include new 
superpowers, by a voluntary renunciation of the veto when ‗humanitarian 
intervention‘ is at issue,209 or an expanded, deliberative advisory role for the 
General Assembly. 
 
At the end of her account, Cohen gives the impression of not giving up on R2P 
completely. If R2P were to take the idea of sovereignty-as-responsibility 
seriously, R2P could perhaps serve different means: it could contribute to a 
rebalancing of the debate on humanitarian intervention. From a one-sided 
cosmopolitan discourse which occasionally takes its wishes for reality and 
thereby opens the door for abuse, R2P might become part of a more balanced 
narrative which rehabilitates the sovereign equality of states and thus the UN 
collective security system, as well as incorporates a well determined set of 
human rights into hard international law. Such a project still needs to be started 
up. It requires a shift in perspective and a reformulation of the basic premises 
on which R2P stands. In that respect, the contribution of Cohen is significant 
and warmly welcomed. 
 
 
                                                        
208 Ibid., 23, footnote 66. 
209 Admittedly, the ICISS mentioned this possibility as well. A proposal of a ‗constructive 
abstention‘ was made, whereby members of the P5, when national interests are not at stake, agrees 
not to block a decision by use of its veto whenever humanitarian interventions are being discussed. 
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